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local use."
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Further, the Court, finding "no actual conflict, ei-

ther between FIFRA and the ordinance [in question] or between
FIFRA and local regulation generally," 697 held that the local ordinance was not preempted by the federal regulation. 69 8 Thus,
the impact of section 2(c) of article IX of the New York State
Constitution upon local government regulation appears to mirror
the impact of the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution upon state and local law.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
Ba Mar, Inc. v. County of Rockland 699
(decided January 22, 1991)

The owners and operators of mobile home parks in Rockland
and Putnam Counties brought two separate actions claiming that
certain local laws were unconstitutional under the state constitution. 70 0 The appellate division consolidated the cases for this
appeal and held that by enacting section 233 of New York's Real
Property Law (RPL), the state has preempted the field of mobile
home park regulation. The court also found that the local laws
were inconsistent with section 233 of the RPL and were, therefore, invalid on both grounds. 70 1
Both Rockland and Putnam counties enacted legislation to protect mobile home owners from eviction and to protect their rights
to sell their mobile homes. Both counties determined that section
696. Id.

697. Id. at 2486.
698. Id. at 2487.
699. 164 A.D.2d 605, 566 N.Y.S.2d 298 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 78
N.Y.2d 877, 577 N.E.2d 58, 573 N.Y.S.2d 67, appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d
982, 580 N.E.2d 407, 574 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1991).
700. N.Y. CoNsT. art. IX, § 2; see also MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10
(McKinney Supp. 1992).
701. Ba Mar, 164 A.D.2d at 607, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 299; see N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 233 (McKinney 1990).
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233 of the RPL was ambiguous and inadequate to protect mobile
home owners from arbitrary eviction, loss of the right to sell
their homes, and a series of unfair practices by mobile home park
owners. The court discussed the different needs and difficulties of
mobile home owners which led the New York State Legislature
to enact section 233. Since its enactment in 1973, "the statute has
been amended five times. .. [and] now.

. .

regulates many, if

not all, of the rights, duties, obligations and responsibilities of
mobile home park owners/operators and those who reside in
mobile home parks." ' 70 2 The court of appeals in Miller v. Valley
Forge Village703 explained that the statute assures that an
"[i]nherent economic imbalance may not be exploited by park
owneis either through unfair monopolistic practices or by threat
of eviction for failure to comply with burdensome park
rules." 70 4
The court began its analysis by explaining that the doctrine of
preemption is a fundamental limit on the broad powers delegated
to the local governments to enact local legislation. The court
noted that even seemingly consistent local legislation may not
exist in an area that the state has clearly evinced a desire to preempt. Even if the laws are not in express conflict, if the subject
matter is that which has been preempted by state legislation, the
local law is deemed inconsistent with "'the State's transcendent
interest.' 705 Thus, if local laws were permitted to exist when
they were preempted by state law they would "'inhibit the operation of the State's general law and thereby thwart the operation of
the State's overriding policy concerns."' 70 6 However, the court
also noted that because state and local governments legislate in
the same area, the local legislation is not automatically invalid on
702. Ba Mar, 164 A.D.2d at 609-10, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
703. 43 N.Y.2d 626, 374 N.E.2d 118, 403 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1978).
704. Id. at 629, 374 N.E.2d at 120, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
705. Ba Mar, 164 A.D.2d at 612, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 302-03 (quoting Albany
Area Builders Ass'n. v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 377, 546
N.E.2d 920, 922, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (1989)).
706. Id. at 612, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 303 (quoting Jancyn Mfg. Corp. v.
County of Suffolk, 71 N.Y.2d 91, 97, 518 N.E.2d 903, 905-06, 524
N.Y.S.2d 8, 11 (1987)).
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preemption grounds. Instead, there must be intent (express or
7
implied) by the state to occupy the entire field. 70
The court found that althotgh there is no express provision in
section 233 of the RPL indicating intent to preempt the field of
mobile home legislation, the fact that the state legislature enacted
a comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme indicates the
legislature's intent to do so. 708 The court cited several factors
that evidence the intent on the part of the legislature to preempt
this area. First, the scope of section 233 is extremely broad.
Second, the statute itself is detailed and comprehensive. Third,
there is a section of the statute which requires that all mobile
home park owners file an annual registration with the state,
which envinces a clear intent by the state to provide statewide
uniformity in this area. 70 9 Fourth, RPL section 233 is not the

7 10
only law regulating mobile parks and mobile homes.
The court then determined that even if the state had not desired
to preempt the field of mobile home park regulation, the many
inconsistencies between section 233 and the local laws at issue
would render the local laws invalid. 7 11 The court stated that "[a]
local law is obviously inconsistent with a State law where there is
an express conflict between the two," 7 12 although the inconsistency need not be express and may be implied. The court
concluded that the local laws were not only invalid because they
were preempted by the state laws, but were also invalid because
they were inconsistent with the state laws. 7 13

707. Id.; see also Albany Area Builders Ass'n, 74 N.Y.2d at 377, 546
N.E.2d at 922, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
708. Ba Mar, 164 A.D.2d at 612-13, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
709. Id. at 613, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
710. Id.; see also N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 1120-23 (McKinney
1991); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1984); N.Y. GEN. BUS.
LAW §§ 720-24 (McKinney 1984).
711. Ba Mar, 164 A.D.2d at 614, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
712. Id.
713. Id. at 616, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
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